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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Darcy Murphy appeals the district court's decision to revoke his probation, or
alternatively, its decision to not reduce his sentence at that time.

He asserts that

decision constituted an abuse of the district court's discretion. As part of his appeal,
Mr. Murphy requested that several transcripts be produced and augmented to the
appellate record, but the Idaho Supreme Court denied that motion.

Mr. Murphy

contends this constitutes a violation of his state and federal constitutional rights to due
process and equal protection. 1 As a result, this Court should grant Mr. Murphy access
to the requested transcripts and allow him the opportunity to file supplemental briefing
raising any issues arising from review of those transcripts. In the event that request is
denied, this Court should still vacate the district court's order revoking probation and
executing the underlying sentence without modification and remand the case for a new
disposition hearing. Alternatively, it should reduce Mr. Murphy's sentence as it deems
appropriate.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Murphy pied guilty to driving under the influence pursuant to a plea
agreement. (R., p.36.) That was Mr. Murphy's first felony offense. (See Presentence
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.2-6.) 2 The district court imposed a unified
sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, on Mr. Murphy, but decided to retain

1

Mr. Murphy recognizes that the Idaho Supreme Court recently heard argument in a
case raising similar issues. State v. Brunet, Docket No. 39550. Obviously, the decision
in that case may affect or resolve some of the issues raised in this brief.
2 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file
"MurphyPSI." Included in this file are the PSI report and all the documents attached
thereto (police reports, addendum from rider staff, etc.).
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jurisdiction. (R., pp.48-51.) Later, the rider staff reported that Mr. Murphy performed
well during the period of retained jurisdiction.

(See PSI, pp.99-106.) They anticipated

he would complete all his assigned programs.

(PSI, p.100.)

Therefore, they

recommended that he be placed on probation. (PSI, p.99.) The district court did so,
suspending Mr. Murphy's sentence for a ten-year period of probation. (R., p.82.) As a
term of that probation, the district court ordered Mr. Murphy to complete drug court.
(See R., p.71.)

However, Mr. Murphy was not as successful in the drug court program as he had
been in the rider program. (See, e.g., Tr., p.18, Ls.11-21.) He admitted that he failed to
complete the program, and thereby violated his probation. (R., p.107.) As a result, he
agreed to be discharged from drug court.

(Tr., p.5, Ls.16-18.)

At the disposition

hearing on that matter, the State, pointing to Mr. Murphy's criminal history and the fact
that he had been given the opportunity to participate in both the rider and drug court
programs, asked the district court to execute the underlying sentence.
L.12 - p.15, L.7.)

(Tr., p.14,

Mr. Murphy asked the district court to consider returning him to

probation for another shot at drug court since, as his attorney pointed out, he had begun
to show some insight into his actions. (Tr., p.16, L.6 - p.17, L.6.) In the alternative, he
requested the district court exercise its authority pursuant to 1.1.C.R. 35.R. 35 and
modify his sentence from a unified, ten-year sentence with, three years fixed, to a
unified, ten-year sentence, with only two years fixed.

(Tr., p.17, Ls.12-15.) Defense

counsel pointed out that exercising this authority would allow Mr. Murphy to get into
prison rehabilitation programs more quickly and would potentially allow him the
opportunity for placement in a work center. (Tr., p.17, Ls.15-17.) However, the district

2

court, also pointing to Mr. Murphy's criminal history, executed Mr. Murphy's sentence
without modification. (Tr., p.18, L.11 - p.19, L.18; R., pp.114-16.)
Mr. Murphy filed a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35. 3 The
district court explained why it decided the sentence was appropriate as it was.
(R., pp.128-29.) As such, it denied Mr. Murphy's Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.126-30.)
Mr. Murphy filed a notice of appeal that was timely from the order revoking his
probation and imposing the sentence without modification. (R., pp.120-22.) On appeal,
Mr. Murphy moved to augment the record with transcripts from the guilty plea hearing
held on December 22, 2010, the sentencing hearing held on February 2, 2011, and the
jurisdictional review hearing held on July 13, 2011. (Motion to Augment and Suspend
the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, filed June 27, 2013.) The
Idaho Supreme Court denied that motion without prejudice. (Order Denying Motion to
Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule Without Prejudice, dated July 15, 2013
(emphasis in original).)

Mr. Murphy later renewed his motion, providing additional

authorities and rationales demonstrating why the requested transcripts needed to be
augmented to the appellate record. (Renewed Motion to Augment and to Suspend the
Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, filed September 9, 2013.) The
Idaho Supreme Court denied that motion without explanation.

(Order Denying

Renewed Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, dated September

27, 2013 (emphasis in original).)

There was no additional information attached to the Rule 35 motion itself, although it
did indicate that Mr. Murphy anticipated filing letters of support or certificates of
completion in support of his motion. (R., p.118.) However, no subsequent filings
appear to have been made. (See generally R., pp.8-9 (Register of Actions for the
relevant time period showing no additional filings by Mr. Murphy).) Mr. Murphy does not
challenge the denial of his Rule 35 motion on appeal.
3
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ISSUES
1.

Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Murphy due process and equal
protection when it denied his motion to augment the record with transcripts
necessary for review of the issues on appeal.

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Murphy's
probation or, alternatively, when it executed his sentence without modification
when it did so.

4

ARGUMENT
I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Murphy Due Process And Equal Protection When
It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With Transcripts Necessary For Review
Of The Issues On Appeal

A.

Introduction
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees

indigent defendants that they will not be denied access to transcripts which are relevant
to issues they intend to raise on appeal. So long as the record reflects a colorable need
for such a transcript, a court may not refuse to provide that transcript unless the State
proves that the transcript is not relevant to an issue raised on appeal.
Mr. Murphy has raised a challenge to the decision to revoke his probation and
execute his sentence, or, alternatively, to not reduce his sentence sua sponte when it
did so. To present those claims, he requested various transcripts be made part of the
appellate record. The Idaho Supreme Court denied the request for the transcripts from
the guilty plea hearing held on December 22, 2010, the sentencing hearing held on
February 2, 2011, and the jurisdictional review hearing held on July 13, 2011.
As such, Mr. Murphy is also challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his
request for these transcripts.

Mr. Murphy asserts that the requested transcripts are

relevant to the challenge of the district court's decisions when it revoked his probation
and executed his sentence because the applicable standard of review requires an
appellate court to conduct an independent review of the entirety of the proceedings in
order to properly evaluate the district court's decisions.

5

B.

By Failing To Provide Mr. Murphy With Access To The Requested Transcripts,
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Murphy Due Process And Equal
Protection Because He Cannot Obtain An Effective Appellate Review Of His
Claims

1.

The United States Constitution And The Idaho Constitution Require, As
Part Of Their Protections Of Due Process And Equal Protection,
Transcripts Of Relevant Hearings To Be Provided To Indigent Defendants

The United States Constitution, as well as the Constitution of the State of Idaho
guarantees criminal defendants due process and equal protection under the law. U.S.
Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const. art. I, § 13. Due process requires the defendant be
given notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 333 (1976); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991), overruled on other grounds

by State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1998). Essentially, due process requires that judicial
proceedings be "fundamentally fair." Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of Durham City,
452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981); Card, 121 Idaho at 445. Those same standards have been
applied to article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution.

Maresh v. State, Dep't of

Health & Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to an appeal is created by statute.

See

I.C. § 19-2801. If an indigent defendant requests a relevant transcript, such transcript
must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a); I.C.R 5.2(a);
I.C.R. 54.?(a). An order revoking probation is made after the judgment of conviction
and affects the defendant's substantial rights.

State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852

(Ct. App. 1983). As such, it may be appealed as a matter of right.

I.AR 11 (c)(9);

State v. Thomas, 146 Idaho 592, 594 (2008).
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether
transcripts must be provided when such a right is established.
6

Its decisions have

established two fundamental themes.

First, the scope of the due process and equal

protection clauses is broad. Second, disparate treatment of indigent defendants is not
tolerable. As a result, the State must provide an adequate record for appellate review,
but that record need not include frivolous or unnecessary materials.
The seminal opinion from the United States Supreme Court is Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956). In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial
court asking that a certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript
of the proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. At that
time, the State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been
sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase
transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme
Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death-penalty
defendants was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that:
[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike is an age old
problem .... Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim
of our entire judicial system-all people charged with crime must, so far as the law
is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American
court.'
Id. at 16-17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)). As such, "[i]n

criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account
of religion, race, or color." Id. Furthermore:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
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poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitions from invidious
discriminations.
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
provided with a record which facilitates an effective, merits-related appellate review.
At the same time, the United States Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript
is not necessary in instances where a less expensive, but no less adequate, alternative
exists. Id. at 20.
The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Griffin when it struck
down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court be accompanied with a
requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency.

See Bums v. Ohio, 360

U.S. 252 (1959). The Court held:
[O]nce the State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal cases, it
may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that procedure
because of their poverty. This principle is no less applicable where the
State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its
appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second
phase of that procedure solely because of his indigency.
Id. at 257. To permit otherwise, according to the Court, would result in an impermissible

destruction of the defendant's ability to pursue the right afforded him by the State. Id. at
258.
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court clarified its statement in Griffin that a stenographic transcript is not necessary if an equivalent alternative is available.
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 494-95 (1963). To that end, the Court did note

that "part or all of the stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to
consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds
8

unnecessarily in such circumstances."

Id. at 495.

However, the Court went on to

discuss the specific issues raised for appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance
of the requested transcripts, and it ultimately concluded that the issues raised by those
defendants could not be adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic
transcripts of the trial proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
The United States Supreme Court continued to expand the protections identified
in Griffin, applying them to non-felony offenses.
U.S. 189 (1971).

See Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404

Additionally, it placed the burden on the State to prove that the

requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on appeal. Id. at
195. In doing so, the Court held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument
that he or she needs the requested items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. If
a review of the appellate record establishes a need for the requested transcripts, it
becomes the State's burden to prove that the requested transcripts are not necessary
for the appeal. Id.
Both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have recognized
and applied the United States Supreme Court's precedent in this regard.

See, e.g.,

Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App.
2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 2007). As such, if the record reflects
that the transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal and the State has not proved
that they are unnecessary for appellate review thereof, due process and equal
protection mandate that those transcripts be created and augmented to the record.

9

2.

The Transcripts Requested By Mr. Murphy Are Relevant To The Issues
He Has Raised On Appeal

The requested transcripts are necessary to review Mr. Murphy's claim that the
district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation, or, alternatively, failed
to reduce his sentence sua sponte when it did so. These transcripts are all necessary
because the Idaho Supreme Court has decided that the appellate courts will conduct an
independent review of the record available to the district court.

State v. Pierce, 150

Idaho 1, 5 (2010). Particularly, in probation revocation cases, such as this, the standard
of review of probation violation cases involves a review of the entire record.

See

State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 149 (1986). This includes information from the original

sentencing hearing and the change of plea hearing where the district court heard from
the defendant about the acceptance of responsibility by pleading guilty.

See

State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that

is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire
record encompassing events before and after the original judgment.

We base our

review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events
occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." (emphasis
added)). This standard of review is necessary in Idaho because judges are not required
to state their sentencing rationale on the record. See State v. Nield, 106 Idaho 665, 666
(1984).
The transcript from the December 22, 2010, guilty plea hearing is specifically
necessary based on prior decisions by Idaho's appellate courts, which are, for the
moment, good law. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Burdett has
failed to include the transcript form his change of plea hearing wherein, according to the
district court minutes, he was examined by the court regarding his guilty plea. Portions
10

of a transcript missing on appeal are presumed to support the actions of the district
court."); see a/so State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805 (1996) (applying the same
presumption in absence of a complete record). The minutes from that hearing indicate
that Mr. Murphy was "sworn and examined by the court" as to his intent to plead guilty
and the nature of his plea agreement, and from that, it was determined that there was a
factual basis for the plea. (R., pp.36-37.) Therefore, because his comments would be
available for consideration at a future sentencing determination (like the one currently
on appeal), they are part of the record an appellate court reviewing that future
determination would consider. Pierce, 150 Idaho at 5; Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. As
such, a transcript of the December 22, 2010, hearing should be augmented to the
record
The transcript from the February 2, 2011, sentencing hearing is specifically
necessary because Mr. Murphy made a statement of allocution at that hearing. (R.,
p.47.)

The defendant's statements in allocution are relevant to the sentencing

determination.

See, e.g., State v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 2003),

abrogated on other grounds by State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 887-88 (Ct. App. 2013)
(finding that, while allocution is important, it does not rise to the level of a constitutionally
protected right, as the opinions in Gervasi and other cases had suggested), rev. denied.
Since such information would be available for consideration at a future sentencing
determination, it is part of the record considered by the appellate courts reviewing that
future sentencing determination. Pierce, 150 Idaho at 5; Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28.
Therefore, a transcript of that hearing should be augmented to the appellate record.
The transcript from the July 13, 2011, jurisdictional review hearing is specifically
necessary for similar reasons. Mr. Murphy was "sworn and examined by the court" and
11

made various statements, including statements concerning his application to treatment
programs, such as drug court. (R., pp.70-71.) Rider review hearings, such as the one
held on July 13, 2011, deal with similar concerns to sentencing hearings, since the
district court is deciding whether or not to release the defendant on probation or execute
his sentence and remand him to custody. State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205 (Ct. App.
1990); see also State v. Meiwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998). That decision is guided by
the same factors that the district court considers at sentencing. See Meiwin, 131 Idaho
at 648. Therefore, his statements at a rider review hearing have a similar impact to
statements of allocution, which are important to sentencing determinations.

See

Hansen, 154 Idaho at 887-88; Gervasi, 138 Idaho at 816. Since all these statements
speak

to

the

sentencing

factors,

they

would

weigh

into

future

sentencing

determinations, and thus, are part of the record that an appellate court reviewing a
future sentencing determination would consider. Pierce, 150 Idaho at 5; Hanington, 148
Idaho at 28. Therefore, a transcript of this hearing should be augmented to the record.
However, the Idaho Court of Appeals recently discussed the scope of review of
an order revoking a defendant's probation in response to a similar challenge.

See

Statev. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012). The Court of Appeals held that the
transcripts of the proceedings predating the probation violation currently on appeal were
not necessary to the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the
second probation violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it
based its revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings."

Id. at 621.

In reaching that decision, the Court of Appeals refused to address the

defendant's claim that the Idaho Supreme Court had denied him due process on the
basis that it does not have the power to overrule a decision by the Idaho Supreme
12

Court. 4 Id. at 621. However, the Morgan Court went on to state that it would have the
authority to review a renewed motion to augment, which contained information or
argument not presented to the Idaho Supreme Court, if it was filed with the Court of
Appeals after the case was assigned to it. Id.; see also State v. Cornelison, 154 Idaho
793, 796 (Ct. App. 2013), rev. denied.

Nevertheless, in cases where it has been

presented with such a motion, it has denied the motion without explanation.

See

State v. Jorgensen, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 615, p.2 (Ct. App. August 5, 2013),
pet. rev. filed. As such, it appears unlikely that filing a renewed motion with the Court of
Appeals will lead to anything except a new, independent violation of Mr. Murphy's due
process and equal protection rights.

If the Court of Appeals is correct, and it is without authority to decide such questions,
then an order assigning this case to the Court of Appeals would also constitute an
independent violation of Mr. Murphy's state and federal constitutional rights to due
process. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ID. CONST. art. I § 13. As the Idaho Supreme
Court has explained:
4

It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiterv. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981 ).

Card, 121 Idaho at 445. In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by
statute. See I.C. § 19-2801. Defendants have the right to appeal from judgments
affecting their substantial rights. Thomas, 146 Idaho at 594; I.A.R.11 (c)(9). The
decision to revoke probation is such an order. Therefore, since the Fourteenth
Amendment's protections apply to all proceedings affecting this appeal, the Idaho
Supreme Court would violate those protections by assigning this case to the Court of
Appeals knowing it was without authority to resolve the issues presented therein.
13

Despite asserting it was without authority to consider the issue, the Court of
Appeals turned to the merits of the claim in Morgan, explaining that the scope of review
for a revocation determination did not include a review of those previous hearings:
[l]n reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that all
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane.
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues
which are properly made part of the record on appeal.
Id. (emphasis in original).

However, whether or not the transcripts of the requested

proceedings were before the district court at the time of the probation revocation
hearing is irrelevant in regard to whether the transcripts are relevant to the issues on
appeal.
In reaching a decision regarding the defendant's sentence, a district court is not
limited to considering only that information offered at the hearing from which the appeal
is filed.

Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its own official

position and observations. See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App.
2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings
of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the district court heard
during trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318, 321 (1977) (recognizing that the district
court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the
judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs
therein involved"). In fact, the Court of Appeals has held that such review is not only
proper, but is actually expected because "the judge hardly could be expected to
disregard what he already knew about [the defendant] from the other case."
State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491, 495 (Ct. App. 1984). Thus, whether the prior hearings

14

were transcribed at the time of the revocation hearing leading to the appeal is irrelevant
because the district court may rely upon the information it already knows from presiding
over the prior hearings when it made the sentencing decision after revoking probation.
In fact, the reason that the appellate courts should look to the entire record when
reviewing the executed sentence has been explained by the Court of Appeals:
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two
reasons.
First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order
execution of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not
artificially segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment
categories. The judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire
course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision.
When reviewing that decision, we should consider the same facts.
Second, when a sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the
defendant has scant reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the
probation is later revoked, and the sentence ordered into execution, does
the issue of an excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were
we to adopt the state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived
if not made on immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but
suspending a sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive
appeals as a hedge against the risk that probation someday might be
revoked. We see no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do
we wish to see the appellate system cluttered with such cases.
State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989). As such, when an appellant

files an appeal from a sentence executed after the revocation of probation, the
applicable standard of review requires an independent and comprehensive inquiry into
the events which occurred prior to the probation revocation proceedings, as well as the
events which occurred during those proceedings.
The basis for this standard of review is that the district court "naturally and quite
properly remembers the entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in
reaching a decision." Id. It follows that "[w]hen reviewing that decision, [an appellate
court] should consider the same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not state that the
15

district court must expressly reference prior proceedings at the probation disposition
hearing in order for this standard to become applicable. To the contrary, the appellate
courts will presume that the district court considered the prejudgment events when
determining what sentence should be executed after revoking probation.

See Sivak,

105 Idaho at 907; Wallace, 98 Idaho at 321; Downing, 136 Idaho at 373-74; Gibson,
106 Idaho at 495.

Therefore, whether or not the prior hearings were transcribed is

irrelevant, as an appellate court will assume that the district court will remember the
events from the prior proceedings when it executes a sentence after revoking probation.
See id.

3.

The Idaho Supreme Court Violated Mr. Murphy's Constitutional Rights By
Denying His Motion To Augment The Record With The Relevant
Transcripts

Since the requested transcripts are relevant under the applicable standard of
review, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny Mr. Murphy access to those
transcripts constitutes a violation of his due process and equal protection rights. See,
e.g., Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195; Callaghan, 143 Idaho at 859.

For example, when a

verbatim transcript was necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the appellate court, the
courts improperly foreclosed access to the appellate process by denying indigent
defendants access to such transcripts. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-85 (1963).
The United States Supreme Court made it clear that it is "constitutionally invalid ... to
prevent an indigent from taking an effective appeal." Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in
Idaho, an appellant must provide an adequate record for review or face procedural
default:

"It is well established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an

adequate record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of
error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are
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presumed to support the actions of the trial court."5 State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34
(Ct. App. 1999); see a/so Mowrey, 128 Idaho at 805 (applying this presumption in
absence of a complete record). Therefore, if Mr. Murphy fails to provide the appellate
court with the transcripts necessary for review of his claim, this legal presumption will
apply and Mr. Murphy's claims regarding the excessiveness of his sentence will not be
addressed on their merits. In effect, that presumption (a result of the Idaho Supreme
Court not affording him access to relevant transcripts) would deprive him of an effective
appeal, making the appeal constitutionally invalid on due process and equal protection
grounds. See Lane, 372 U.S. at 480-85.
Alternatively, if it is state action alone which prevents the defendant from access
to the necessary items, because such action is a violation of equal protection and due
process, any such presumption should no longer apply. See, e.g., id. at 485. In that

5

If transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes of those hearings, it is
possible the appellate courts might find that to be sufficient to conduct a meaningful
appellate review, and so the transcripts are not necessary for appellate review in such a
case. However, the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate
counsel not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that]
Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). Given that
holding, it is unlikely that the minutes will be sufficient to conduct a meaningful review,
and thus, a record containing only the minutes is unlikely to comport with the
constitutional requirements to provide due process and equal protection.
For example, the minutes of the February 2, 2011, sentencing hearing only
indicate that Mr. Murphy "makes statement." (R., p.47.) It does not make any reference
to the contents of the statements. (See R., p.47.) The contents of those statements,
particularly since they would be classified as the defendant's statements of allocution,
are relevant to an abuse of discretion in sentencing claim, such as is being made in this
case (see Section II, infra). See, e.g., Hansen, 154 Idaho at 887-88; Gervasi, 138 Idaho
at 816. The same problem exists in regard to the minutes of the other hearings for
which Mr. Murphy requested transcripts. (See, e.g., R., p.36 (minutes of December 22,
2010, change of plea hearing, indicating that Mr. Murphy talked regarding "intent to
plead guilty; written guilty plea; sworn and examined by the court"); R., p.70 (minutes of
July 13, 2011, rider review hearing, indicating that Mr. Murphy talked regarding "intent to
enter drug court; sworn and examined by the court"). Therefore, the minutes, which do
not provide the substance of these statements, are insufficient in this case to provide for
adequate review. See Murphy, 133 Idaho at 491.
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situation, the foregoing presumption should be reversed, and what occurred at those
hearings should be presumed to discredit the district court's ultimate decision to revoke
probation. When Mr. Murphy was first placed on probation and given the opportunity for
multiple periods of probation thereafter, the district court must have found, at each
subsequent hearing, that the circumstances were right to give Mr. Murphy the
opportunity to continue his rehabilitation as a member of society. See State v. Merwin,
131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998). Therefore, by placing Mr. Murphy on probation on each of
those prior occasions, the district court must have determined that the mitigating factors
presented outweighed the aggravating factors presented. See I.C. § 19-2521; Merwin,
131 Idaho at 648. As such, to presume that the missing transcripts of those hearings
supports the decision to relinquish jurisdiction ignores the mitigating factors that were
present at those hearings and presents a negative, one-sided view of Mr. Murphy. As a
result, the denial of access to the requested transcripts has prevented Mr. Murphy from
addressing those positive factors in support of his appellate claims.

In light of that

denial, Mr. Murphy argues that the events which occurred at the subject hearings
should, at least, be presumed to invalidate the district court's final sentencing decisions
in this matter.
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts necessary for
an effective, merits-based review on appeal. The requested transcripts are relevant to
the issues on appeal because the applicable standard of review for an appellate
sentencing claim requires the appellate court to conduct an independent review of all
the proceedings before the district court. Under this standard of review, the focus is not
on the district court's express sentencing rationale; to the contrary, the question on
18

appeal is if the record itself supports the district court's ultimate sentencing decision. As
such, the decision to deny Mr. Murphy's request for the necessary transcripts will render
his appeal ineffective and meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing
transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions.

This functions as a

procedural bar to the appellate review of Mr. Murphy's sentencing claims on the merits
and, therefore, he should either be provided with the requested transcripts or the
presumption should not be applied. Since Mr. Murphy's request for those transcripts
was denied, that presumption means that the district court's sentencing decisions
should be reversed.

By Failing To Provide Mr. Murphy With Access To The Requested Transcripts,
The Idaho Supreme Court Has Denied Him Due Process Because He Cannot
Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

C.

The United States Supreme Court, relying on Griffin, supra, and its progeny, has
held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also gives
defendants the right to counsel on appeal and requires effective representation:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trial-would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to the effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (relying on Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963)). As
such, the remaining issue is defining what constitutes effective assistance of counsel on
appeal.
According to the United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a
conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments
to be made.

See, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
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The

constitutional requirements of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained
where counsel acts as an active advocate on behalf of his client. ... [Counsel's] role
as advocate requires that he support his client's appeal to the best of his ability. Id.;
see also Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack
of access to the requested transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a
conscientious examination of the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel
from determining whether there is an additional issue to raise or whether there is factual
support in favor of, or cutting against, any argument made. Therefore, Mr. Murphy has
not obtained appellate review of the court proceedings based on the merits of his claims
and likely was not provided with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the starting point for
evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance in a criminal action is the
American Bar Association's Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function.
State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 432 (1991). These standards offer insight into the role
and responsibilities of appellate counsel. Specifically, those standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-8.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
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decision to revoke probation, which is now at issue.

Further, counsel is unable to

advise Mr. Murphy on the probable role the transcripts may play in his appeal.
Mr. Murphy is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant
transcripts.

Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Murphy his

constitutional rights to due process and equal protection, which include the right to
effective assistance of counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be
provided with access to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity
to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of
that review.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Murphy's Probation Or,
Alternatively, When It Executed His Sentence Without Modification When It Did So

A

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Murphy's Probation
Mr. Murphy asserts that, given any view of the facts, the decision to revoke

probation and execute his unified sentences of ten years, with four years fixed, was an
abuse of the district court's discretion. The decision to revoke probation is one within
the district court's discretion.

State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000).

The district court must determine "whether the probation is achieving the goal of
rehabilitation and whether continuation of the probation is consistent with the protection
of society." Id.

The Legislature has established the criteria for determining whether

probation or incarceration is merited. Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648 (citing I.C. § 19-2521 ).
In reviewing such a decision, the Court of Appeals uses a multi-tiered inquiry,
determining "(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of
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discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion
and consistent with any legal standards applicable to the specific choice before it; and
(3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id. at 312-13
(citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)).
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, to be considered in that regard
are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally;
(3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
The protection of society is the primary objective the court should consider.
State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Therefore, a sentence that protects

society and also accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable. Id.;
State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). This is because the protection of

society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, each must be
addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500.
There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether
protection of society and rehabilitation (along with deterrence and retribution) are served
by a particular disposition. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006). They
include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good character, status as a first-time
offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to treatment, and support of
family." Id. Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis for a more
lenient sentence in several cases.

See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90

(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco,
114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301
(1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982).
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These same factors are

appropriately considered in regard to the decision to revoke probation.

See

State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 106-07 (2009).
In this case, several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently
considered by the district court as it crafted its disposition in regard to Mr. Murphy. As a
result, it did not sufficiently consider whether Mr. Murphy's probation was adequately
serving the goal of rehabilitation or whether society required protection from Mr. Murphy
through incarceration.

See Chavez, 134 Idaho at 312.

Therefore, this disposition

constitutes an abuse of discretion.
For example, while Mr. Murphy does have a criminal record, this is his first felony
conviction. (See PSI, pp.2-6.) The Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first
offender should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal."

Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595, (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled
on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971)).

Therefore, it

considered the fact that it was the defendant's first felony to be a factor in mitigation.

Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595.
Furthermore, Mr. Murphy has employable skills. (PSI, p.11; Tr., p.17, L.18.) He
has also been able to maintain steady employment. (See PSI, p.11.) This weighs in
favor of probation because it means he will be more able to pay his outstanding fines,
fees, costs, and restitution, which is a factor the district courts should consider. See
I.C. § 19-2521 (2)(f).
Finally, Mr. Murphy has shown amenability to treatment. He completed the rider
program, earning a recommendation for probation from the program staff. (PSI, p.99.)
Specifically, "[h]is instructor has nothing but positive comments about his good
behavior, good sense of humor, and active participation in all aspects of the program.
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Mr. Murphy has demonstrated through his work and behavior he is seriously invested in
the program . . . . "

(PSI, p.105.)

He also completed the Ada County Jail Active

Behavior Change Program and the Ada County Sheriff's Office Substance Abuse
Program. (PSI, pp.85-86.) He had also begun to show some insight into his actions.
(Tr., p.16, L.6 - p.17, L.6.)

His issues in regard to drug court may also have been

related to his mental health issues.

Mr. Murphy indicated that he suffers from

depression and anxiety, and is on a medication regimen to help him deal with those
issues.

(R., p.40; Tr., p.8, Ls.6-17.)

The GAIN-I Recommendation and Referral

Summary in his PSI indicates that he was having problems he associated with those
conditions which were affecting his programming. (PSI, pp.93-94.) Idaho Code § 192523 requires the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing
factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). As such, continued rehabilitation via
continued probation should have been considered with efforts made to address the
impact of Mr. Murphy's mental health issues on his programming. See id.
However, the district court refused to continue considering rehabilitation in its
sentencing determinations:
(Tr., p.19, Ls.17-18.)

"Quite frankly,

you've

had enough programming."

By refusing to consider rehabilitative opportunities, the district

court refused to consider one of the goals of sentencing that it is required to consider.

See Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500; Toohi/1, 103 Idaho at 568 That alone demonstrates
the abuse of its discretion. See id.
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that such a sentence, one
which considers continued rehabilitation, would still address all the other objectives protection of society, punishment, and deterrence.

See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho

703, 713 {1993) (requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing
24

objectives). When a sentencing court suspends a sentence and orders probation, it still
imposes and executes a sentence. Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent
effects of the imposed sentence are still present. See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13,
14-15 (Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how a sentence for a period of probation addresses
all the sentencing objectives and how the court's continuing jurisdiction affects those
objectives).

In addition to restricting his liberty at the discretion of the Board of

Correction and the looming sentence, he would also be deprived of several of his rights
(such as the right to possess a firearm), since this is a felony offense. Furthermore, the
district court would retain the ability to revoke probation and execute the original
sentence if Mr. Murphy were to fail to adhere to the terms of his probation. However, it
could do so knowing that all the sentencing objectives were properly addressed. What
the probationary period would provide that a term sentence would not is the opportunity
to rehabilitate in a real-world setting, allowing Mr. Murphy to apply the lessons he would
gain in out-patient treatment in a practical setting.

B.

Alternatively, The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Reducing
Mr. Murphy's Sentence When It Revoked Probation
If the district court decides to resume the execution of the underlying sentence by

revoking probation, it also has the authority to reduce the sentence, sua sponte,
pursuant to Rule 35. State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008). The decision to not
reduce a previously-pronounced sentence will be reversed on appeal if it constitutes an
abuse of the district court's discretion. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27 (Ct. App.
2009). The standard of review and factors considered in such a decision are the same
as those used for the initial sentencing. Id.; see Toohi/1, 103 Idaho at 568 (identifying
the factors to be considered at sentencing).
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Therefore, the district court needed to

sufficiently consider the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating
factors in the record. See id.; Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. A failure to do so should
result in a more lenient sentence. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90; Shideler, 103
Idaho at 595.
In this case, the evidence shows that Mr. Murphy had been making some
progress in his programming (though admittedly, not up to the district court's
expectations for the term of his drug court program). (Compare Tr., p.16, L.6 - p.17, L.6
(noting that Mr. Murphy had begun to make progress) with Tr., p.18, Ls.11-21 (noting
Mr. Murphy's issues in the drug court program).)

As defense counsel noted, an

exercise of discretion in this regard would afford Mr. Murphy to get into prison programs
more quickly and would potentially allow him the opportunity for placement in a work
center. (Tr., p.17, Ls.15-17.)
Such a sentence would still address all the sentencing objectives - protection of
society, punishment, rehabilitation, and deterrence.

See Ransom, 124 Idaho at 713

(requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing objectives). The
more lenient sentence would still execute a sentence.

Thus, even though the

sentences in this case may be more lenient, they would still provide for a significant
period of custodial supervision, if not incarceration.

Such a sentence would punish

Mr. Murphy by depriving him not only of his liberty for that period of time, but several of
his rights (such as the right to possess a firearm), since this is a felony offense.
Therefore, both retribution and deterrence would be served by a more lenient sentence.
See, e.g., State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 (Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how even

a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the sentencing objectives).
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In this case, the court would not lose anything in terms of protection of society,
deterrence, or punishment by imposing a more lenient sentence. Society would receive
equally similar protection in both cases, as Mr. Murphy would be in the custody of the
Department of Correction either way. He would be unable to harm society during the
period of initial incarceration, and the parole board would maintain the discretion of
whether to release him again.
What the more lenient sentence would provide that the excessive sentence
would not is the opportunity to rehabilitate, and as the Supreme Court has noted,
rehabilitation is more likely now than in the future.

See Owen, 73 Idaho at 402.

Specifically, it would give him the opportunity to return to his family and build those
relationships, offering and receiving support in that community. Failing to provide the
rehabilitative alternatives would actually decrease the protection for society in the long
term because such a sentence does not decrease the risk for recidivism as effectively
as a sentence which does focus on rehabilitation. Therefore, the best way to protect
society would be to provide Mr. Murphy with rehabilitative opportunities. To not do so
results in lesser protection for society in the long term, which means the sentence fails
to sufficiently address the primary sentencing objective, and thus requires modification.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Murphy respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise
as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Murphy respectfully
requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate, or, in the
alternative, remand the case for a new disposition hearing.
DATED this 8th day of October, 2013.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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